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ABSTRACT
Governments use redistributive policies to favor relatively unproductive economic
sectors. Traditional economic wisdom teaches that the government should instead
buy out the agents in these sectors, and let them relocate to more productive
sectors.We show that redistribution to a sector whose agents have highly correlated
incomes generates an insurance value. Taking this insurance value into account, a
buy-out is not sufficient to compensate the agents in the sector for relocating. In
fact, it may be efficient for the government to sustain agents in an activity that,
while less productive, is subject to correlated income shocks. US data suggests that
indeed, sectors that receive transfers are subject to more correlated income shocks
than others.
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“Parliament, do you not realize that free trade would increase the national
income?” As if the Parliament did not know this! At their most sophisticated,
these economists have added: “If you must aid farmers or whomever, tax a
portion of the larger income obtained with free trade and give the revenue
directly to the people the tariff was intended to help.” As if they had studied the
comparative efficiency of subsidizing a given group by tariffs as compared with
general taxes and selective subsidies.
Stigler (1982)
Redistributive policies are ubiquitous. Economists have a good understanding of why
redistribution exists, but not why it takes the form it takes. Often, governments redis-
tribute through tariffs, quotas, and other distortionary means. Why do they not give a
direct subsidy to the policies’ recipients, and avoid the deadweight loss from the dis-
tortionary redistribution? A salient example is the transfer that a protected industry
receives from a tariff on international trade. This protection keeps factors of production
tied to a relatively unproductive sector, when these factors could relocate (and would
without protection) to a different, more productive, sector of the economy. The mon-
etary value of the transfers is small compared to the total loss from the distortions
introduced by the policy. For instance, Hufbauer and Elliott (1994) calculate that tar-
iffs for the 21 most protected industries in the US cost consumers $32 billion. After
subtracting the producer’s gains and tariff revenues, the net loss for the economy is
$10.7 billion.
If the government wants to redistribute wealth to favor a sector of the economy, it
can choose among several policies that would give the industry the same raise in wealth.
As detailed, for example, by Rodrik (1994), the most efficient policy would be a one-
time lump grant to the industry, and no protection thereafter – a buy-out. This kind
of redistribution does not affect the incentives to locate factors in the most productive
sector. Increasingly costlier ways to redistribute are: Subsidies to employment, which
keep agents tied to less productive sectors; subsidies to production, which create the
incentives to raise production in a relatively unproductive industry; and tariffs, which
make consumers pay more for their products and obstruct the gains from international
trade.The puzzle is why redistributive policies take a form that keeps factors employed in
less productive sectors, and why the government does not instead buy out these sectors.
In this paper, we offer an answer to the puzzle. We argue that redistributive policies
that keep agents in a relatively unproductive sector may in fact be more efficient than a
buy-out. The reason is that the political process that generates redistribution is such that
it provides agents with insurance, in addition to wealth. We first note that redistributive
transfers are responsive to the demands made by agents in different sectors, and that
demands depend on agents’ well-being. In particular, other things being equal, an agent
is more likely to demand a transfer for her sector when she receives a negative shock than
when she receives a positive shock. As a consequence, agents in sectors where income
shocks are highly correlated will be more cohesive in their demands for sectoral transfers.
Hence, a given agent who receives a negative shock will obtain a higher transfer in a
high-correlation, cohesive, sector than in other sectors, because there will be more agents
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like her demanding transfers to the sector. An agent is therefore better insured by the
redistributive policies in a cohesive sector than in the rest of the economy, and if she
accepts a buy-out she loses the insurance.
Belonging to a cohesive group has a value that is not captured by the calculations of
deadweight loss. To buy out an agent from a cohesive sector, one must give her more
than the expected transfer she would receive in the sector: one must compensate her for
the insurance she loses when, engaged in other economic activities, she belongs to less
cohesive groups. In other words, it may be cheap for a government to give a certain level
of utility to a group if it engages in an activity that, while less productive, is subject to
correlated individual shocks.
A first look at the publicly-available data supports the explanation we have laid out.
Our theory has a clear testable implication: The data should show a positive relation
between correlation of incomes and tariff protection. The publicly-available US data
suggests that this is indeed the case. That said, the emphasis of our work has been on
developing a theory, and further empirical work is clearly needed to test our theory
conclusively.
Our explanation follows the arguments in Becker (1976) and Stigler (1982) that, unless
agents make systematic mistakes, redistribution must take a less inefficient form than
alternative policies. Tariffs, they argue, may be inefficient, but they must be the most
efficient way of performing the redistributive task they perform.
Our first results show how a benevolent government may want to maintain agents in
an unproductive sector; in a sense, we carry out the calculation that Stigler suggests in
our quote. We find a specific reason for why the seemingly inefficient policies that keep
agents in unproductive sectors may be better than the alternatives. They may be better
because they take advantage of the correlation in incomes – a technological feature of
the sector in question – to provide agents with higher utility, via insurance, for a given
expected value of transfers. We then show, in a model of political participation, that the
insurance effect is present even when the government is not explicitly trying to insure
the agents.
We can make Stigler’s suggested comparison more explicit: If a government wants
to redistribute income to agents who receive a negative shock, it may use a system of
individual income taxation. Varian (1980) emphasizes how income taxation affects the
incentives to work, and how a social planner would have to trade-off the efficiency loss
from reducing the incentives toworkwith the insurance effect from reducing the variance
of individual income.1 Our results, on the other hand, highlight that group transfers also
provide social insurance, without the adverse effects on incentives to work. If the income
shocks in a sector are highly correlated, then the average income of the sector serves as
an adequate public signal of the individual income of all agents in the sector: When the
sector receives a negative shock, all agents are affected. The government can then offer
transfers to all agents in a particular sector when the sector is poor, and tax the agents
when the sector is rich, and at the same time keep the tax on marginal individual income
1 Forteza (1999, 2001) has also studied this trade-off, with emphasis on the time inconsistency of
avoiding social insurance.
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at zero. The government may offer these transfers out of concern for social welfare or
strategically to entice voters.
In our results, the government insures sectors against aggregate shocks in an economy
without private insurance markets. What if there are private markets for the relevant
risks? We note first that in practice it is often the government and not markets who pro-
vides insurance, at least in the sectors that are relevant for our paper. Second, we present a
version of ourmodel with private-insurancemarkets for the aggregate shocks under con-
sideration. We show how in this economy with private insurance markets, government
redistribution still sustains an unproductive sector and increases social welfare.
The literature that tries to explain the form of redistributive policies is not large.
Dixit and Longregan’s (1995) and Mitchell and Moro’s (2006) work is closest to ours,
in the sense that they too explain why governments do not buy out the recipients of
redistributive policies. To ease the exposition in the sequel, we shall refer to a generic
relatively-unproductive sector as “farming.” Dixit and Londregan argue that, if the
government cannot commit to future transfers, individual farmers will prefer to remain
farmers and not incur the costs of relocating to another sector. In their model, which
builds on the political competition models of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Dixit
and Londregan (1996), the transfers are such that farmers who relocate are taxed to
subsidize farmers who do not relocate. Dixit and Londregan’s explanation relies on the
farmers being in a coordination failure, each individually failing to internalize the social
gains from the relocation of the group. Our explanation of the puzzle relies on quite
differentmechanisms; we view it as complementary toDixit andLondregan’s.We should
mention, though, that it may be possible for a government to break the coordination
failure in Dixit and Londregan’s model by offering farmers a conditional buy-out offer
– a buy-out offer that only comes in place if most farmers accept (offers of this kind are
used in corporate take overs, for example).
Mitchell and Moro (2006) present a model where there is uncertainty about the degree
of inefficiency in farming. In particular, they assume that only farmers know how much
they need to be compensated in order to agree to a buy out. Mitchell and Moro show
that seemingly inefficient transfers to farming may in fact be efficient, conditional on
the informational asymmetry in their model. Our explanation relies on very different
mechanisms, but we have in common the conclusion that policies which are traditionally
regarded as inefficient may be efficient, once the right constraints are taken into account.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) present a model where farmers favor policies that
induce more agents to enter farming, because they gain more political power in the
future. Their explanation requires that larger groups obtain larger per capita transfers.
Acemoglu and Robinson explain why incumbent farmers favor the inefficient entry-
inducing policy over a non-distortionary lump-sum transfer. But their model does not
explain – nor does it claim to explain – the stated puzzle: a government would still benefit
from buying out the incumbent farmers by giving them the present value of the transfers
they would obtain with the larger group size. Interestingly, Acemoglu and Robinson’s
explanation implies that sectors with larger specificity of factors receive smaller transfers.
Our explanation has, if anything, the opposite testable implication (we discuss this issue
in more detail below).
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Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2004) present a three-sector model with one productive labor-
intensive sector, one productive capital-intensive sector, and one purely wasteful sector
which is also labor-intensive. They show that policies – such as tariffs – that sustainwages
in a less-productive, labor-intensive, sectormay be optimal, as they prevent workers from
engaging in purely wasteful activities.
Coate and Morris (1995) consider policies that may or may not be inefficient, and
show that the governmentmay use these policies, evenwhen it knows they are inefficient,
because they benefit an interest group in a covert way. Coate and Morris explain policies
whose inefficiency is uncertain. The puzzle we try to explain, as stated in the litera-
ture, refers to unambiguous policies. Coate and Morris deal with essentially a different
phenomenon than our puzzle.2
SOCIALLY OPTIMAL REDISTRIBUTION
We shall demonstrate our point in a stylized model with two large groups. First, we
consider a benevolent government who wants to use transfers to insure individuals. We
show that the government may want to sustain a group because its income correlation
makes transfers effective as insurance. As a result, the government may want to sustain
a less productive sector, if it has high income correlation.
Second, we consider politicians offering transfers to voters, in a probabilistic voting
model. We show how income correlation can make a sector more cohesive politically, and
as a result be better insured by the process of political competition. The second model
reduces to the first model of a benevolent government, and our result on maintaining a
group with high correlation – a cohesive group – holds.
Consider two groups of agents, IA and IB, with a continuum of agents in each group;
assume that Im =
[
0, 1
]
, m = A,B.3 Agents are identical, with one exception: the
agents in group A receive perfectly correlated wealth-shocks, while those in group B
receive independent wealth-shocks. The marginal distribution of wealth is the same for
all agents, but the joint distribution is different across groups. Concretely, individual
wealth, wi , is drawn from a continuous distribution G with full support on [0, 1], for
both groups. The difference is that the wi in group A are perfectly correlated, so that
i, i′ ∈ IA and wi = w implies wi′ = w. The wi in group B are independent; that is, if
i, i′ ∈ IB, then the event wi = w conveys no information about the realization of wi′ .
Each agent i derives utility from consumption. An agent’s consumption is given by
her wealth and a government transfer, which can be negative or positive. A benevolent
government aims to maximize social welfare by choosing transfers tm to the individuals
of group m. The utility of agent i in group m is
v(wi + tm).
2 Dixit and Londregan (1995) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) make the same point about Coate
and Morris (1995).
3 The assumption of a continuum of agents is analytically convenient. We ignore the technical issues
discussed in Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985).
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We assume that v : R+ → R is increasing, continuously differentiable, strictly con-
cave.
A budget constraint on the government requires that the transfers must be balanced,
so that tA = −tB.
The assumption that the government can only implement group (not individual)
transfers is crucial. Assuming that individual wealth is exogenous and unobservable,
only group transfers are possible. In a more general model, the government could set
up an income tax system, which would serve to redistribute wealth across individuals,
rather than across groups. But one can interpret our model as a reduced form of the more
general model. Individual transfers affect agents’ incentives to work; group transfers
(when groups are large) do not. If income is taxed and later redistributed to those with
less wealth, then every agent has lower incentives to work and would optimally choose
to shirk or enjoy more leisure, with the consequent loss of production and wealth for
the society. As a consequence, one would imagine that individual transfers would not
fully insure the agents, and that group transfers would still be used. Our approach would
apply to group transfers and after-tax wealth that still submit the agents to a significant
degree of risk.
The government’s choice of transfers (tA, tB) solves the following problem:
max
∫
v(wA + tA(wA))dG(wA) +
∫∫
v(w˜ + tB(wA))dG(w˜)dG(wA)
s.t. tA(wA) + tB(wA) = 0.
We refer to the government’s objective function as social welfare.
The government can condition the transfers on the wealth of group A, which is
observable, and thus provides insurance by subsidizing group A when this group is poor,
and taxing it when the group receives a high wealth shock.
For any level of wealth in group A, the government redistributes wealth from one
group to another until the average marginal utility from consumption is equal in both
groups.
Let Tm be the expected transfer to an individual in group m, i.e., Tm =
∫
tm(w)dG(w),
m = A,B. The first result is that belonging to group A and receiving the corresponding
wealth-dependent transfers is better than receiving the expected transfer that accrue to
group-A agents. Whereas, belonging to group B is worse than receiving the expected
transfer that accrue to group-B members.
Lemma 1 The government’s optimal transfers t∗A, t∗B satisfy:
(1) Ev(wA + t∗A(wA)) > Ev(wA + TA), and
(2) Ev(wB + t∗B(wA)) < Ev(wB + TB),
where wA and wB are the (random) wealths of group-A and group-B individuals,
respectively.
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Proof: To save onnotation, let x(w) = t∗A(wA) = −t∗B(wA) andT = TA. The first-order
condition of the government’s maximization problem requires that, for every w:
v′(w + x(w)) =
∫ 1
0
v′(w˜ − x(w))dG(w˜). (1)
Since v′ is decreasing, x(w) is monotone decreasing. Then there is w¯ such that if w ≤ w¯
then x(w) ≥ T and if w ≥ w¯ then x(w) ≤ T .
First, if w ≤ w¯,
v(w + x(w)) − v(w + T ) =
∫ x(w)
T
v′(w + s)ds ≥ v′(w + x(w))[x(w) − T]
and if w ≥ w¯ then
|v(w + x(w)) − v(w + T )| =
∫ T
x(w)
v′(w + s)ds ≤ v′(w + x(w))|x(w) − T |.
So, either way,
v(w + x(w)) − v(w + T ) ≥ v′(w + x(w))[x(w) − T]. (2)
Then∫
v(w + x(w)) − v(w + T )dG(w) ≥
∫
v′(w + x(w))[x(w) − T]dG(w)
=
∫ ∫
v′(w˜ − x(w))dG(w˜)[x(w) − T]dG(w)
=
∫
l(x˜)
[
x˜ − T]dH (˜x)
> 0.
The first equality is from Equation (1). The second equality comes from letting H be
the distribution of the random variable x(w), and
l(x) =
∫
v′(w˜ − x)dG(w˜).
The last inequality follows because l is a positive, strictly monotone increasing function
and
∫ [
x˜ − T]dH(x) = 0 by a standard argument in probability theory. So this proves
that Ev(wA + t∗A(wA)) > Ev(wA +TA). The statement for group B is immediate because
v is concave, and wA and wB are independent. 
The intuition behind the result is straightforward: Since the transfers only depend
on the wealth shock of group A, agents in A receive some insurance against this shock.
Group-A agents receive positive transfers when they are poor, and pay transfers when
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they are rich, while transfers to B-agents do not depend on their own wealth, but on
that of group-A members. For B-agents, transfers are a mean-preserving spread over
TB. Since agents are risk averse the result follows.
Our second result is that twice the expected transfer to A-agents is not enough to
compensate them for becoming B-agents.
Proposition 2 An agent prefers to be a member of group A than to receive 2TA for sure and
then become a member of group B. Formally:
Ev(wA + t∗A(wA)) > Ev(wB + 2TA + t∗B(wA)).
Proof: The result follows from Lemma 1, because
Ev(wA + TA) = Ev(wB + TA)
= Ev(wB + 2TA + TB)
> Ev(wB + 2TA + t∗B(wA)).
The first inequality holds because individual wealth is drawn from the same distribution
G for both groups. The second equality follows from the budget balance requirement
TA = −TB. The inequality follows the concavity of the function v. 
The results should be interpreted as follows. Suppose the government considers buy-
ing out agents in group A by offering a compensation for relocating to group B. Consider
two possible offers, an individual and a collective buy-out.
In an individual buy-out, an A-agent relocates to group B, but she imagines that
the redistributive policy remains in place, so that group-A agents continue receiving
transfers t∗A financed by−t∗B. Then she gives up an expected transfer ofTA as anA -agent,
and pays an expected −TA as a B-agent, so the relevant compensation would be 2TA.
Proposition 2 says that 2TA is not enough compensation for the proposed relocation.
In a collective buy-out, all the members of A are bought out, and there is no more
redistribution. The relevant compensation is then TA, as an A-agent loses the expected
value of transfers. But since there are now no transfers, and the marginal distribution
of wealth is the same for both groups, Equation 1 in Lemma 1 implies that TA is not
enough compensation for the relocation.
In either case, the insurance value of belonging to group A makes the buy-out less
efficient than a simple calculation of expected transfers would suggest.
In fact, social welfare strictly decreases if group A is bought out. To see this, first
note that the social welfare with transfers is necessarily higher than without transfers, as
t∗A and t∗B are not identically zero when v is strictly concave. Second, since the marginal
distribution ofwealth isG in both sectors, fixing the transfers at zero in all states yields the
same individual expected utility for every agent as a forced relocation of all A members
to group B with no compensation yields – with no transfers, agents are indifferent about
group membership. Third, a buy-out with compensation TA = 0 reduces social welfare
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relative to a buy-out with no compensation, since it represents a mean-preserving spread
in the distribution ofwealth of risk-averse agents bymaking some richer and some poorer.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the question is why the government does not
buy-out less productive sectors. Yet in our model, both groups had identical (marginal)
wealth distributions. Our modeling assumption sought to identify and isolate the insur-
ance effect caused by a group’s cohesiveness, but the results have obvious implications
for truly less productive groups.
Suppose that sector A is less productive, so that wealth in sector A is wA – α for some
fixed productivity gap α > 0. If the productivity gap is small relative to the insurance
effect we have identified, it is second-best efficient to sustain sector A; second-best, that
is, to some ideal transfers that could depend on agents’ individual levels of wealth.
Corollary 3 There is α∗ such that, if α ≤ α∗, then buying out group A leads to a decrease
in social welfare.
The corollary is straightforward: For α = 0, it is strictly better in terms of social
welfare to keep sector A over buying it out; it follows from continuity of the utility
functions that the sum of expected utilities is still strictly higher keeping sector A afloat
with state-dependent transfers if the productivity gap in favor of B is positive but small
enough. On the other hand, it is efficient to buy out a sector if this sector is sufficiently
less productive, despite how costly it may be to compensate individuals for the insur-
ance effect we identify. In general, there is a trade-off between the productivity gains
determined by α and the size of the insurance effect caused by a sector’s cohesiveness.
The model we have developed demonstrates the insurance value of transfers to cohe-
sive groups. However, it does so abstracting from any political considerations, adopting
the convenient but unrealistic approach of a social planner. In the remainder of the
section we show that the same results follow from the model of political competition
with probabilistic voting due to Lindbeck and Weibull (1987).
In Lindbeck andWeibull’s model, two parties compete for votes by offering transfers –
in a sense they buy votes. Crucially, a voter is more willing to sell her vote when she is
poor than when she is rich. So transfers are more effective, and therefore higher, when
they are given to a poor group. As a result, insurance is naturally built into Lindbeck and
Weibull’s model.4
The two groups of agents IA and IB are now voters.5
Two political parties, Y and Z compete for the votes of the agents. A generic party
is denoted by j. We assume (following Lindbeck and Weibull) that voters have some
intrinsic preference for one of the parties, but parties do not know this preference.
4 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Grossman and Helpman (2001) for a discussion of this model,
and Hillman (1982) for a contrast between social welfare and political support concerns for enacting
redistributive policies.
5 We depart from Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) in assuming a continuum of voters. They have an
arbitrary number of groups, with a finite number of voters in each. We believe this difference does
not drive the substance of our results.
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Each voter i derives utility from consumption, ci , and from which party is in office.
Voter i’s utility is {
v(ci) + ai if Y wins
v(ci) + bi if Z wins.
The numbers ai and bi reflect the voter’s preference for parties Y and Z, respectively.
Each party j promises transfers t jm to the individuals of group m. So, if party j wins,
voter i of group m consumes ci = wi + t jm. Substitute ci in voter i’s utility, and we
conclude that i votes for party Y if
bi − ai < v(wi + tYm ) − v(wi + tZm ).
The parties do not know the values of bi − ai . But they believe each bi − ai is indepen-
dently and identically distributed according to some distribution F. Then the probability
that some voter i ∈ Im votes for Y is
F
[
v(wi + tYm ) − v(wi + tZm )
]
.
The timing of Lindbeck and Weibull’s political game is as follows:
(1) Wealth levels are realized.
(2) Each party j = {Y ,Z} offers balanced per-capita transfers (t jA, t jB). Each party’s
objective is to maximize the expected number of votes it receives.
(3) Elections are held.
The parties learn the realized distributions of wealth: they learn the value of group-A
agents’ wealth, as their realized distribution is always degenerate, and know that the
distribution of group-B voters’ wealth is G. The latter is constant, so parties condition
transfers on the realized wealth of group-A voters.
Givenwealthw for group-A voters, andpromised group transfers (t jA, t
j
B), the expected
number of votes for Y in group A is∫ 1
0
F
[
v
(
w + tYA
)− v(w + tZA)]di = F[v(w + tYA )− v(w + tZA)],
and the expected number of votes for Y in group B is∫ 1
0
F
[
v
(
w˜ + tYB
)− v(w˜ + tZB )]dG(w˜).
Given wealth w for the group-A voters, party Y wants to maximize (and Z minimize)
F
[
v
(
w + tYA
)− v(w + tZA)]+ ∫ 1
0
F
[
v
(
w˜ + tYB
)− v(w˜ + tZB )]dG(w˜).
We assume that the distribution function F is differentiable, with convex and compact
non-singleton support, and strictly positive density on its support.
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Proposition 4 There is a unique Nash equilibrium of the political competition game. This
equilibrium is symmetric, and both parties propose the vector of per-capita transfers (t∗A, t∗B)
that maximize social welfare.
The proposition follows easily from Lindbeck and Weibull’s (1987) results.
The equilibrium transfers coincide with the transfers chosen by a benevolent gov-
ernment. Sector A is not bought out, but rather, state-dependent transfers insure its
members and provide an additional value that makes them better-off than receiving
merely a compensation in the amount of the expected transfer.
If the productivity gap in favor or sector B is small, relative to the insurance value of
the cohesive groups, both a benevolent government and a vote-maximizing party would
prefer to maintain sector A over buying out its members.
LIMITATIONS OF PRIVATE INSURANCE
We have derived our results under the assumption that there are no private insurance
markets. We have shown how seemingly inefficient policies may in effect be providing
insurance that the market does not provide, so the role of insurance markets is important
in our results.
Private insurance contracts may provide payments conditional on individual or
aggregate shocks. Insurance against individual shocks could guarantee a first-best
outcome, and hence affect our results. However, a standard moral-hazard argu-
ment precludes insurance of individual shocks; in the words of Arrow (1968): “If
the amount of insurance payment is in any way dependent on the decision of the
insured as well as on a state of nature, then the effect is much the same as that
of any excise tax and optimality will not be achieved by the competitive system.”
Indeed, the issue of individual shocks is similar to the issue of individual income
taxation – see also our reference to Varian (1980) in the introduction, and the related
discussion.
We focus our discussion on aggregate, sector-wide, shocks; these are the shocks insured
by the government in the previous section. In principle, private insurance markets could
insure sector A against its aggregate shock in wealth without government intervention
(the individual shocks in sector B remain uninsurable).
We make two points. The first is empirical: In the cases we care about (e.g., Agricul-
ture), governments in practice intervene and complement private insurance. In some
instances, no private market provides insurance independently of the government. The
second argument is theoretical: Trade in Arrow–Debreu securities does not preclude a
role for government.
Empirical evidence on agricultural insurance in the United States is consistent with a
prominent role for the government. As noted by Chambers (1989), the development of a
competitive market for agricultural insurance in the United States has been unsuccess-
ful, and crop insurance requires a government subsidy. The government subsidizes crop
insurance through the Risk Management Agency of the Department of Agriculture and
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redistributes transfers toward agriculture, keeping the sector alive instead of compen-
sating farmers for the costs of relocating to more productive sectors of the economy.
Further, Rodrik (1998) presents evidence that even where private insurance could
soften income shocks, the government provides social insurance to compensate for aggre-
gate risks to the economy. In particular, Rodrik finds that a more open economy, which
is subject to greater external shocks by virtue of its openness, correlates with larger gov-
ernment spending. According to Rodrik, the best explanation for this correlation is that
government spending provides social insurance against external risk: “Societies seem
to demand (and receive) an expanded government role as the price for accepting larger
doses of external risk. In other words, government spending appears to provide social
insurance.”
We now turn to a theoretical exploration of private insurance by introducing Arrow–
Debreu securities for aggregate, sector-wide, shocks. We show first how the resulting
equilibrium allocation differs from the one chosen by the government. So the presence
of securities does not preclude a role for the government. We then consider a specific
example where we show that, evenwith a privatemarket in Arrow–Debreu securities, the
less-productive sector would relocate, but government intervention prevents relocation.
We reproduce first the set-up from our model with a benevolent government. Let the
distribution of wealth in each sector be G, and let the perfectly-correlated wealth level
for all agents in sector A be wA − α, where wA is drawn from G and α represents the
productivity gap that makes sector A less productive (see Corollary 3).
The government’s choice of transfers (tA, tB) solves the same problem as in previous
sections: The first-order condition gives that, for every wA,
v′(wA − α + tA(wA)) =
∫
v′(wB − tA(wA))dG(wB). (3)
To allow for private insurance contracts, we introduce Arrow–Debreu securities for
the uncertain state of the world, represented by the wealth level wA. Let there be one
asset for each level of wA, such that the asset corresponding to a given state pays off one
monetary unit if this particular state occurs, and zero otherwise. Assume that, prior to
the resolution of uncertainty, there exist markets where agents can trade these assets in
order to share risks and transfer wealth across states. Denote by pwA be the price of the
asset corresponding to state wA.
Consider the maximization problem of a member of group A. Let qwA be the quantity
of the asset corresponding to wealth wA that this individual buys. Then she has to solve
max
∫
v(wA − α + qwA )dG(wA)
s.t.
∫
pwAqwAdwA = 0.
The constraint
∫
pwAqwAdwA = 0 is the agent’s budget constraint. If the agent does
not trade, she possesses zero units of each asset. If she wishes to insure herself against
state wA, contracting to receive qwA extra monetary units if state of the world wA occurs,
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then the cost of this insurance is pwAqwA and the agent must contract to pay (to receive a
negative q) in other states, so that in the aggregate, the costs and earnings of all amounts
contracted to receive or pay in each state compensate each other. Alternatively, we can
interpret that the agent only buys insurance to receive positive quantities in each state,
but pays an up front fee for this insurance. Then, the budget constraint requires that
aggregating across all states, the cost of the net excess of contracted payments minus the
fee φ is equal to zero and the maximization problem is as follows:
max
∫
v(wA − α + qwA − φ)dG(wA)
s.t.
∫
(pwA (qwA − φ))dwA = 0.
Note that the two interpretations of the maximization problem, either with positive
and negative contingent payments, or with strictly positive contingent payments and an
up-front fee, are equivalent. We follow the first for ease of notation.
Assume that G has a strictly positive density, g. Then we can write the Lagrangian for
this problem as:
L((qwA ); λ) =
∫
{v(wA − α + qwA ) − λqwApwA/g(wA)}dG(wA).
Thus, the first-order condition is, for each wA,
v′(wA − α + qwA ) − λpwA/g(wA) = 0. (4)
Now consider a member of Group B, who chooses a portfolio (qBwA ), with q
B
wA being
how much she buys of the asset corresponding to level of wealth wA. Her maximization
problem is
max
∫∫
v
(
wB + qBwA
)
dG(wB)dG(wA)
s.t.
∫
pwAq
B
wAdwA = 0
Using Fubini’s Theorem, the Lagrangian for this problem is
L((qBwA);µ) = ∫ {∫ v(wB + qBwA)dG(wB) − µqBwApwA/g(wA)} dG(wA).
Thus, the first-order condition is, for each wA,∫
v′
(
wB + qBwA
)
dG(wB) − µpwA/g(wA) = 0. (5)
Equilibrium requires that the purchases of qwA and q
B
wA be in zero net demand. In a
symmetric equilibrium, all A-agents choose the same qwA and all B-agents the same q
B
wA .
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Hence, in equilibrium, qwA = −qBwA . Let σ = λ/µ. As a consequence of Equations (4)
and (5), we have
v′(wA − α + qwA ) = σ
∫
v′(wB − qwA )dG(wB). (6)
Compare Equations (3) and (6): The market outcome corrects some of the inequalities
in wealth, but it does not coincide with the outcome chosen by the government. In equi-
librium, the ratio of expectedmarginal utilities in each sector is constant across states, but
one sector is better off than the other in all states. A relaxation of the budget constraint
is more valuable for the worse-off sector: so σ = 1, as the Lagrange multiplier is higher
for the worse-off sector. The government strives to equalize marginal utilities, but this
is not what the market achieves because the market does not correct the inequality
induced by the productivity gap α, it only equalizes based on what it can insure.
Themarket solution for the risk-bearing problem given by theArrow–Debreu equilib-
rium differs from the benevolent government solution because the government transfers
not only provide insurance for risk-bearing, they also redistribute wealth in favor of the
poor, increasing utilitarian social welfare.
Redistribution enables private insurance to operate, and allows the less productive
sector to survive. We illustrate this point using a numerical example. The example
illustrates how private insurance markets fail to preserve a less productive sector: all
A-agents would migrate to the uninsurable but more productive sector of the economy.
Yet, the government’s redistributive transfers keep sector A alive. In the example, the
market provides the insurance provided by the government in previous sections of our
model. However, the government intervention is crucial for sustaining the sector and
allowing the insurance market to operate.
Example 5 Let wA equal either 1 or 2 with equal probability. Let α = 0.1 and let
wi = wA − α for any i ∈ A. For each j ∈ B, let wj equal either 1 or 2 with equal
probability. Let the realizations of wj be independent. Let v be piece-wise linear, with
v′(x) =
{
1 if x ≤ 1.6
0.5 if x > 1.6
In the absence of private insurance markets or government transfers, expected utility
is 1.325 for A-agents and 1.4 for B-agents. Therefore, if A-agents can relocate to sector
B, they do so. After the relocation the average expected utility is 1.4.
In the equilibrium of the Arrow–Debreu economy, A-agents have a weak incentive to
relocate and let the sector collapse, despite the provision of private insurance. Let there
be state-contingent assets 1 and 2 that pay, respectively, one monetary unit if wA = 1
and one monetary unit if wA = 2. In equilibrium, the relative price of the two assets is
1, A-agents buy 0.3 units of asset 1 and sell 0.3 units of asset 2 to B-agents. Expected
wealth for (A,B)-agents is (1.4, 1.5) and expected utility is (1.4, 1.4), so A-agents are
indifferent about relocating (and an infinitesimal decline in the productivity of sector A
would break the indifference, precipitating the relocation).
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On the other hand, government intervention guarantees that A-agents have a strict
incentive to remain in their sector, and it increases utilitarian social welfare. The gov-
ernment optimal solution is to set transfers from B to A contingent on wA in quantity
t(1) = 0.4 and t(2) = −0.3 so that the expected transfer in favor of A is 0.05, expected
post-transfer wealth is 1.45 in both sectors and expected utility in sectors (A,B) is
(1.45, 1.3625) for an average expected utility of 1.406.
Alternatively, the government can reach its constrained optimal solution letting private
insurance markets operate, and distorting the equilibrium by imposing a transfer t(1) =
0.1.6 The government intervention with active private insurance markets consists on a
subsidy to sustain activity in sector A. This subsidy allows sector A to survive and makes
it possible for private markets to insure the sector.
Note that the government can either impose only the minimal reallocation that would
then lead private markets to reach the utilitarian optimum in equilibrium, or, given that
some form of intervention is necessary, it may instead impose larger transfers to reach
the optimal solution directly, bypassing the markets. This is a possible explanation for
government administered insurance, as documented by Chambers (1989).
Example 5 captures wealth risks and decreasing marginal utility crudely to make
calculations trivial, but the insight is powerful: Privatemarkets and risk-bearing contracts
would not maintain the less-productive sector A. Redistributive transfers dictated by the
government insure the sector and make it viable, and the insurability of the subsidized
sector increases the aggregate social welfare relative to the equilibrium with private
insurance markets.
In our paper, we have studied an instance of this social insurance: Redistributive trans-
fers to a less productive sector with correlated income shocks. We have shown that sus-
taining the sector with transfers becomes a constrained efficient, second-best outcome.
We have shown that even if private markets for risk-sharing exist, not only a benevolent
government concerned with social welfare but also a politically motivated government
concerned with winning elections would deviate from the competitive equilibrium to
insure a less productive sector with redistributive, state-contingent transfers.
TESTABLE IMPLICATIONS
The main implication of our results is that we should observe a high correlation of
incomes in sectors that receive transfers. The US data on household incomes in different
sectors is in line with this implication: Incomes in agriculture, the textile industry, and
the steel industry are more highly correlated than the average sector. We also discuss the
possible link between factor specificity and redistributive transfers.
A higher correlation of incomes in a sector implies that we should observe less variance
of income in our sample of households of the sector. It may be clear intuitively that this is
6 Trades and prices in the equilibrium of the Arrow–Debreu economy described above do not change
when agents take into account the government transfer from B to A.
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true, but it also follows from some simple calculations: Suppose (X1, . . .Xn) is a sample
from some population random variable X , with variance σ2, and such that each pair Xi
and Xj has correlation ρ. Then, using S2 to denote the sample variance, it turns out that
the expected sample variance is:
ES2 =
(
n2 − n + 2
n2
)
(1 − ρ) σ2
(we omit the trivial, but cumbersome, derivation). Thus there is a negative relation
between correlation anddispersion around the samplemean.Our theory implies a smaller
dispersion of incomes in the sectors that receive transfers.
We study household-income data from 1968 to 2003 in the United States.7 We focus
on three sectors, which the literature identifies as recipients of transfers (Hufbauer and
Elliott, 1994): agriculture, textiles, and steel. We use the industrial classification of the
1950 Census Bureau, for which there are 146 sectors in the economy.8
We calculate the standard deviation of individual income for each sector and year, first
deflating incomes by the average economy-wide income. The deflation makes data across
years comparable, and attenuates aggregate shocks. We then compute the average, across
years, standard deviation in the three sectors of interest. Table 1 presents the results, and
the average economy-wide standard deviation.
The numbers in the table are consistent with our models’ testable implication.
Are the deviations significantly lower than average? To compare the deviations of
income in agriculture, textiles and steel to those in the other sectors in the econ-
omy, we order the sectors (after weighting them by size) according to their income
deviations, and we find the percentiles at which agriculture, textile and steel locate
in the resulting distribution. The numbers are in the second column of the table,
and confirm that there is less dispersion in these three sectors than in most other
Table 1. Standard deviation of sectoral income.
Sector Std. Dev. Percentile
Agriculture 0.628 33
Textiles 0.537 7
Steel 0.509 3
Average sector 0.671
7 Current Population Survey data (Bureau of Labor Statistics), obtained from the Integrated Public
Use Microdata Series provided by Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.
Overall sample size is about 2.6 million observations; in Agriculture, for example, we have about
2500 on average per year. The data is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.156/100.00006056_supp.
8 In the classification, our three sectors are “Agriculture,” “Apparel and accessories,” and “Blast
furnaces, steel works and rolling mills.”
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other sectors.9 The result is clearest for textiles and steel, for which less than 7% and
3%, respectively, of the sectors have smaller deviations.
We note that wewould prefer to compare individual correlations in income to themore
indirect method of comparing standard deviations. But the data needed for computing
individual correlations is not in the public domain.
Our theory offers a second testable hypothesis, with regards to the use of specific
factors of production in sectors that receive subsidies.
Factors of production specific to a sector are factors that are used predominantly in one
sector, and cannot easily be relocated to another sector. Our theory implies – somewhat
indirectly – that sectors with specific factors should be prone to receiving transfers.
The implication is in line with some of the previous literature, such as Baldwin (1989),
Brainard and Verdier (1994) or Alt et al. (1996), and with existing empirical evidence
(Zahariadis, 2001).10 But there is controversy about the relation between factor specificity
and transfers: Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) argue that transfers are negatively related
to specificity.
We find two possible links between our theory and the effect of factor specificity on
the amount of sectoral transfers.
First, it is plausible that some specific factors also represent a large fraction of the
incomes in their respective sectors. For example, skilled labor is often both specific, and
an important line in the industry’s cost structure. In that case, shocks to the sector (or
to the factor) result in a high correlation of the incomes in the sector. Our theory then
implies that the sector is expensive to buy out; hence, we should observe that sectors
with specific factors receive transfers.
This first link is a direct consequence of the theory, under the additional assumption
on the importance of the specific factors in a sector. Our second link is possibly valid
more generally, but has a less direct relation to our theory: it focuses on the insurance
value of the transfers to sectors who suffer asymmetric shocks, rather than to sectors
with correlated income.
A sector which employs a specific factor is subject to income shocks caused by fluctu-
ations in the productivity or cost of this factor. These shocks need not be correlated with
the shocks to the productivity of the factors employed in other sectors. Thus, we expect
a sector with specific factors to have income shocks that are less correlated with the
general state of the economy than the income shocks of sectors which all rely in the same
common factors of production. When a sector suffers an asymmetric shock that does
not affect other sectors, the overall economy is in better conditions to afford transfers
to the affected sector, while sectors whose shocks are correlated are in need of trans-
fers precisely when the economy as a whole cannot afford them. As a result, sectors
9 If the reader is concerned about scale effects, we note that we get qualitatively the same results when
we use the coefficient of variation instead of the standard deviation.
10 Zahariadis (2001) studies 13 OECD countries and concludes that factor specificity has a significant
positive effect on the amount of sectoral transfers. More indirectly, Alt et al. (1999), in a case-study
of Norway, argues that specificity is positively related to the pressure for transfers.
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with asymmetric shocks become more likely targets of redistributive transfers with an
insurance purpose.
CONCLUSION
Redistributive policies, such as subsidies and tariffs, distort the incentives to locate
resources efficiently in the most productive sectors of the economy. It is a well-known
puzzle why governments fail to redistribute wealth using lump-sum transfers, which do
not introduce such distortion.
We have provided a solution to this puzzle: State-dependent subsidies to a sector with
high income correlation provide an insurance value to the members of the sector which
is superior to the value of the expected transfer. To provide the same level of welfare with
a lump-sum grant, the government would have to finance an additional compensation
for members of cohesive groups.
We have also discussed the testable implications of this model. The most straightfor-
ward implication is that, in sectors that receive transfers, income correlation ought to be
high. Again, we have presented some suggestive evidence that this is the case. A conclu-
sive empirical study, fleshing out the testable implications of the different explanations
of inefficient redistribution, is called for, but beyond the scope of this paper.
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